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Peking
and the
Vietnam
People's
Struggle

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The world revolutionary movement has recently been following the changes in the foreign policy line pursued by the Peking leadership with growing anxiety. By reaching a compromise with the rulers of the United States, the Chinese leaders are seeking to widen the split in the ranks of the international communist and working-class movement. For the sake of achieving their hegemonic aims, they are intensifying their struggle against the vanguard of the world revolution, against the socialist camp, and against the Soviet Union, in particular.

Peking's adventurist policy was particularly manifested in the period of the Indo-Pakistani conflict, when China betrayed the national-liberation movement in East Bengal. Analysing the present policy conducted by the Maoists, the Austrian newspaper, *Volksstimme*, noted, in December, 1971, that Peking had entered into collaboration with the Yahya Khan military regime and also with the government of the United States, which was waging a war of extermination in Vietnam. The paper also noted that there were two forces in the world in confrontation with each other—socialism of which the Soviet Union is an essential part, and imperialism. "Whoever breaks with socialism", the *Volksstimme* added, "has no other choice but to

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seek allies in the other force, and he finds himself in the camp of the imperialists."

This same thought is underlined by the West Berlin *Die Wahrheit*. It points to the "traitorous role of the Peking leadership, which actually took up a stand of non-interference in the face of the savage bombings inflicted on the Democratic Republic of Vietnam", and goes on to observe that "Peking, which is bidding for the role of representative of the interests of the Third World, is, with its policy, stabbing the national-liberation movement in the back."

The events of the past decade, together with more recent facts (Peking's sudden about-face in Sino-American relations, the stand adopted by the People's Republic of China in relation to the Indo-Pakistani conflict, and the anti-Soviet moves of the Chinese representatives in the United Nations) clearly show that there is a deep abyss between the words and deeds of the Peking leadership. History has repeatedly demonstrated that it is impossible to pose as an advocate of socialism and revolutionary ideals, and at the same time take up a stand against the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, and side with the American imperialists on many international issues.

Cyrus L. Sulzberger, a commentator of *The New York Times* emphasised in the beginning of January, 1972, that the policy of the United States and the policy of China have gradually taken on a single common feature, that of a hostile attitude towards the Soviet Union. He said: "Peking and Washington are obviously not pals, but they realistically imply acknowledgement of parallel interests."*

* *International Herald Tribune*, Jan. 3, 1972.

Commenting on the visit to Peking by a White House delegation, headed by Brigadier-General A. M. Haig, to prepare for President Nixon's visit to the People's Republic of China, this same paper pointed out, somewhat later, that the Sino-American dialogue had already yielded Washington "considerable dividends". The Chinese decision to receive the President of the United States helped to muffle the criticism of the government's foreign policy, including the issues of the Indo-Pakistani conflict and the resumption of the bombing of North Vietnam.

A day earlier, *The New York Times* observed with satisfaction and surprise that Peking had most cordially welcomed the White House delegation, and that Chou En-lai had even received members of the crew of the American President's plane, who, as the paper emphasized, were members of the US Air Force, which was continuing to rain down bombs on Peking's allies in Indo-China.

All these events force us once again to review the change in the position of the leadership of the People's Republic of China with regard to Indo-China.

It is well known that the victory of the Chinese revolution was made possible by the great, all-round assistance of the Soviet Union. This aid (economic, military, scientific and technical, and in the training of personnel) played a major part in the early years of existence of people's power in the People's Republic of China, when truly fraternal relations were established between our two countries, relations based on the principle of proletarian internationalism, and on our community of aims in the struggle for socialism and communism.

Soviet-Chinese co-operation in that period not

only accorded with the interests of the peoples of both countries, but also consolidated the common front of all the revolutionary forces in the struggle against imperialism for national liberation, democracy and socialism.

At that time the Chinese leadership spoke very highly of the internationalist position of the Soviet Union. In a letter from the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union on October 15, 1958, Mao Tse-tung wrote: "We are deeply moved by your boundless devotion to the principles of Marxism-Leninism and internationalism. On behalf of all our comrades—members of the Communist Party of China—I express heartfelt gratitude to you..."

Soviet-Chinese co-operation was a highly important factor deterring the American imperialists from making provocations against the People's Republic of China. The relations between the Soviet Union and China in the fifties played an exceptionally important role in strengthening the common front of the struggle of the peoples of the world against imperialism, increased the influence of the socialist camp in the international political scene, gave hope and encouragement to our friends, and caused fear and impotent fury among our enemies.

As was pointed out in the cabled greetings from the Soviet leaders to the Chinese leaders on the occasion of the 11th anniversary of the formation of the People's Republic of China: "The friendship and unity of the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China and all the socialist countries is a powerful factor of modern times, which is exerting a decisive influence on the entire course of development of mankind."

However, at the end of the fifties new trends

began to appear in the relations of the People's Republic of China with the socialist countries, which at first only caused bewilderment, but later, to the great delight of the world reactionary forces, developed into an open political and ideological attack by Mao Tse-tung's group on the socialist community and the world communist movement.

WASHINGTON WAS NOT WRONG IN ITS CALCULATIONS

These trends in the foreign policy of the Peking leadership could not but cause anxiety among all China's friends, among all who wished to see China as a socialist and prosperous country. The great-power ambitions, and nationalist tendencies, which for a certain time remained hidden behind protestations of allegiance to proletarian internationalism, became increasingly apparent in the actions of the Chinese leadership. The men in power in Peking evidently decided that, having, with the aid of the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries, achieved certain successes in the development of the national economy, the People's Republic of China no longer needed their support, and that the time had come for the realization of the hegemonic aspirations of the Mao Tse-tung group. At the same time, there began to appear in the Chinese propaganda, at first camouflaged but later quite undisguised, statements about the exclusiveness of China, the special significance of "the ideas of Mao Tse-tung" and of the experience of the Chinese revolution, allegedly, the only one for all countries to follow. A campaign

was started in the Communist Party of China and among the Chinese people to undermine the prestige of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, and to prepare the ground for a radical change in the foreign policy of the People's Republic of China. In pursuit of these aims, the delegation of the Communist Party of China at the 1960 Conference of Communist and Workers' Parties proposed that the policy of peaceful co-existence be replaced by one of "brinkmanship", a policy of constantly threatening direct armed conflict with imperialism.

This policy was especially vividly manifested in the early sixties. The book, *Self-Education of a Communist*, reprinted in 1962 in Peking and later anathematised along with its author, Liu Shao-chi, contains the following interesting lines: "Certain representatives of dogmatism in the Communist Party of China understood nothing about Marxism and merely juggled with Marxist-Leninist terminology, believing that they were a 'Chinese Marx' or else a 'Chinese Lenin', and posing as Marx and Lenin in the Party. Furthermore, they, without a twinge of conscience, demanded that the members of our Party respect them as Marx and Lenin, that they be supported as 'leaders', and that 'fidelity' and 'affection' be shown to them." These words, written in the late thirties, are of topical significance today, because they help to give a more correct idea of the present political views of the Peking leadership.

The Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Soviet Government, putting above everything else the cohesion of the socialist camp and the unity of the international revolutionary movement, tried, by means of negotiations, to remove the differences which had

sprung up. The Soviet Union realised that the US imperialists would most certainly try to take advantage of the dissension in the socialist community and intensify their interference in Indo-China in order to crush the national-liberation movement of the Vietnamese people. In February, 1960, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union informed the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China that it was willing to take part in a friendly meeting to discuss existing differences, and, in April of that year, it invited an official party and government delegation, headed by Mao Tse-tung, to come to the Soviet Union. These proposals were rejected by the leadership of the People's Republic of China.

In April, 1960, China published a number of articles which were later printed in a collected work, entitled: *Long Live Leninism!* This work, as well as subsequent documents and statements by officials of the People's Republic of China, outlined the views of the Peking leadership on major issues of the strategy and tactics of the international revolutionary movement. Further developments showed most clearly that the "ultra-revolutionary" propositions advanced by Mao Tse-tung and his group were just a smoke-screen to hide their real intentions of pushing the world into an armed conflict in order to make use of its consequences to achieve their own, great-power, aims.

The Peking leadership set forth this policy in defiance of the 1957 and 1960 International Conferences of Communist and Workers' Parties, although the documents of these conferences were also signed by representatives of the Communist Party of China. These documents pointed out that the general line of the international communist

movement in the given historical stage consisted of preventing an armed conflict between the two socio-economic systems, and extending the class and national-liberation struggle, the struggle for the triumph of socialism and communism throughout the world.

It will be appropriate at this point to quote the statement of the Central Committee of the Working People's Party of Vietnam, adopted at a Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee in August, 1960. Having examined the results of the Bucharest Conference of Communist and Workers' Parties of the socialist countries, the Plenary Meeting noted in particular that changes had taken place in the international situation in favour of the forces of peace and democracy, and that "each day the possibilities for safeguarding peace and averting a new world war are improving." This document particularly emphasises: "Now, as never before, the preservation and further strengthening of the solidarity and unity of the countries of the socialist camp and the Communist and Workers' Parties of the whole world on the basis of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism is a highly important task of all the Marxist-Leninist Parties."

In accordance with a policy endorsed by practically all the communist parties, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, from the very beginning, supported the heroic struggle of the Vietnamese people for the freedom of their motherland, and the struggle of all patriots for national liberation, no matter where it was waged. Addressing a Soviet-Vietnamese friendship rally in Moscow in the summer of 1961, the head of the Soviet Government noted: "The Democratic Republic of Vietnam has in the person of the Soviet Union

a reliable and true friend in the struggle for the upbuilding of socialism, for the peaceful unification of the country. We share your confidence that, despite the difficulties and obstacles, the heroic struggle of the Vietnamese people will certainly lead to the establishment of a single, peaceful, democratic Vietnam." *Pravda* said in December, 1963: "The Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the entire Soviet people deem it to be their international duty to render all possible political and economic support, and, if necessary, aid in the form of armaments, for the national-liberation struggle of the peoples." The article further emphasised that "the unity of the communist parties is the core of cohesion of the working class, all the working people, and the whole of progressive humankind, and is the fundamental guarantee of the victory of the cause of socialism and peace."

But the leaders of the Communist Party of China brushed aside the principle of equality, friendship and mutual respect in relations among the socialist countries, and began interfering in the internal affairs and foreign policy of other states, thereby breaking away from proletarian internationalism and whipping up feelings of hatred and alienation among different nations. While supporting in its statements the principle of respect for the independence of each socialist country, Peking endeavoured to drive a wedge between the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries, to disunite the fraternal states, and to make for itself an exclusive position in the socialist community in order to dictate its will.

The Peking propaganda agencies began publishing anti-Soviet propaganda regularly, slanderously distorting the internal and foreign policies of the

Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Soviet Government.*

The Soviet Government's statement of September 22, 1963, emphasised that the widespread propaganda campaign promoted by the Chinese leadership "is no longer a comradely discussion among Communists, but a manifestation by people who had set themselves the aim to discredit at all costs the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Soviet Union, split the communist movement, and shake the unity of the anti-imperialist forces".

While taking the line of discrediting the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, and divorcing the national-liberation movement from the socialist community, the leaders of the People's Republic of China protested loudly about their own revolutionary character. But facts by then showed quite clearly that the Chinese leaders were not putting first the interests of peoples fighting for national liberation and socialism. Rather they were pursuing their own great-power aims. It was precisely for the sake of attaining these aims that the

* At the same time, the authorities of the People's Republic of China instigated incidents on the Soviet-Chinese border, which at times assumed the form of crude provocations. In 1962 alone, more than 5,000 violations of the Soviet border from the Chinese side were registered. As was pointed out in the Soviet Government's statement of September 22, 1963, the Chinese tried, without preliminary permission, to "work" individual areas of Soviet territory. At times almost incredibly brazen actions took place. For instance, a Chinese citizen, who crossed the border, had on him a directive of the People's Committee of the Heilungkiang Province, which said: "Taking into account the friendly relations between our states, we believe that the Soviet side will not use force to expel our fishermen from the islands." Chinese citizens could occupy Soviet territory and work on it, while the Soviet side, "taking into account the friendly relations" between the USSR and the People's Republic of China, should take no steps to expel them!

leadership of the People's Republic of China not only ceased to co-ordinate their moves on the international scene with other socialist countries, but even deemed it unnecessary to inform the socialist countries about these steps, although agreement had earlier been reached on this matter.

Planning to make a rupture with the USSR, the Chinese authorities swiftly curtailed economic, scientific, technical and cultural ties with the Soviet Union. They rejected or utterly ignored the numerous Soviet proposals on expanding trade and developing co-operation between the two countries. The leadership in Peking began openly to denigrate value of the treaties and agreements concluded with the fraternal countries. In particular, Chen Yi, the former Minister of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, declared in December, 1963, that Soviet promises of aid to China in the event of imperialist aggression "are easy to make, but are worthless. Soviet defence is of no value to us." In May, 1966, when the US imperialists intensified the bombing of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, Chen Yi, in a conversation with correspondents of the capitalist press, was more straightforward: "We rank the USSR among our 'dangerous friends', without which China feels herself in greater safety."

Launching its struggle against the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries, Peking tried to drive a wedge between the national-liberation movement and the working class of the developed capitalist countries, declaring that the decisive role now belonged to the peoples of the colonial countries who had taken the road of their liberation. This erroneous conception was strongly condemned by the majority of the communist parties of the world. Addressing a Plenary Meeting of the Cen-

tral Committee of the French Communist Party in October, 1963, Maurice Thorez, General Secretary of the French Communist Party, emphasised that, without the October Revolution and the victories for which the Soviet people had paid with their blood in the struggle against Hitlerism and Japanese militarism, the Chinese comrades would not have been able to come into power so fast. And it was also true that without the support of the proletariat of the parent socialist country, the struggle of the Vietnamese comrades... would have been much harder. Somewhat earlier, Mao Tse-tung also spoke out in the same vein, and it is appropriate to quote him at this juncture: "...Had it not been for the Soviet Union, had it not been for its victories in the anti-fascist world war, had it not been—and this is particularly important for us—for the crushing of Japanese militarism, had it not been for the emergence of countries of new democracy in Europe, had it not been for the growing struggle of the oppressed peoples of the East, had it not been for the growing struggle of vast numbers of people in the United States, in Britain, in France, in Germany, Italy, Japan and in other capitalist countries against the reactionary clique who were in power—and had it not been for all these factors, then the pressure of the international reactionary forces would, naturally, have been much stronger than at present. Would we have been able to achieve a victory in such conditions? Of course not. In precisely the same way, it would have been impossible to consolidate the victory after it had been won."

Several years later, in conformity with the new political line of the Mao Tse-tung group, the newspaper, *Jenmin jihpao*, said, on July 11, 1966, that

the revolution in China had been victorious (and also that China had inflicted defeat on "ferocious Japanese imperialism" and routed "American imperialism and its lackeys, the reactionary Chiang Kai-shekites") "independently... relying on the people's own forces and without any material aid from outside."

In connection with such comments from the Chinese press, we shall cite only one example: after defeating the Kwantung army, Japan's strongest, which in itself gave tremendous support to the revolutionary forces of China, the Soviet Army handed over to the People's Liberation Army more than 3,700 guns, mortars and grenade dischargers, 600 tanks, 861 aircraft, naval vessels, and other combat material. The Soviet Union prevented US intervention in North-East China, which became the base from which the final assault against the counter-revolution was launched, an assault which brought freedom to the Chinese people and led to the formation of the People's Republic of China.

But the divergence between the Chinese leadership and the international communist movement is only the visible part of the iceberg. The main trouble was—and this is still the trouble today—that the leadership of the Communist Party of China, in pursuit of its hegemonic aims, launched an open struggle against the international communist movement and was ready to go to all lengths, including splitting its ranks and reaching a compromise with imperialism. It will be remembered that Peking has strongly opposed any positive steps by the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries on the international scene. For instance, the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water was

regarded by China as a personal insult. The Chinese statement of July 31, 1963, alleged that the Soviet Government, by signing this Treaty, "betrayed the interests of the Soviet people, betrayed the interests of the peoples of the countries of the socialist camp, China included, betrayed the interests of all peace-loving peoples of the world". This was a crude provocation, planned in advance and calculated to aggravate Soviet-Chinese relations, and to aggravate the entire international situation. This conclusion is confirmed, in particular, by the fact that, according to the most modest estimates, *Jenmin jihpao* alone published more than 700 anti-Soviet items in the latter half of 1963.

That this was a provocation is also borne out by the words of Mao Tse-tung, who, at a meeting with representatives of a number of communist parties of Latin America in 1959, put forward the idea of the desirability of international tension to replace the policy of peaceful co-existence which was endorsed by the international communist movement. "I believe that none of you should be afraid of international tension," he said. "I personally like international tension." Eduardo Mora Valverde, a member of the leadership of the Popular Vanguard Party of Costa Rica, who took part in that discussion, observed later that "only those people, who are out of their minds, can speak of the desirability of international tension and world thermonuclear war." The Rules of the Communist Party of China, adopted at the Eighth Congress of the Party in 1956, said that "the Communist Party of China stands for a foreign policy aimed at safeguarding universal peace and at the peaceful co-existence of countries with different systems."

At that same time, representatives of China began active undermining operation within the ranks of international democratic organisations. Antoine Tabet, a prominent public leader of the Lebanon, wrote that they were trying "to sow suspicion with regard to the disinterested help of the Soviet Union to the developing countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America", which, as he emphasised, "was and remains vital for the victory of these countries in the struggle against imperialism and colonialism, vital for their achievements in the social and economic fields."

The divisive policy of the Chinese leaders, which did great damage to the cause of national liberation, was naturally of the greatest interest to the ruling circles of the United States, and to all the enemies of socialism.

These actions of the Chinese leadership were a source of delight to the imperialist propagandists. No wonder that the US press kept shouting about a "crisis" in the international communist movement, and urged the governments of the United States and of other imperialist countries to make use, in their interests, of the differences arising from the divisive activities of the leadership of the Communist Party of China.

In 1964, General James Van Fleet, former commander of US troops in Korea, wrote that it would be worthwhile for America to seek allies in Peking. As though replying to the American general, Mao Tse-tung, in a discussion with French MPs—which was published in *Paris-Presse-l'intransigeant* on February 21, 1964,—outlined the area within the framework of which China was prepared to co-operate with France, West Germany, Italy, Britain and Japan. It was clear from his words that such a drawing together was not conceived on the ba-

sis of the general idea of the peaceful co-existence of states with different social systems. It was rather the intention to weaken China's co-operation with the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries, and to undermine the unity of the world communist and national-liberation movements.

In response to this political line taken by Peking, the "brains trusts" of imperialism began to elaborate schemes for using it in order to start active subversive operations within the ranks of the communist and national-liberation movements, and to weaken the socialist community.

The divisive policy of the Peking leadership was strongly condemned by the overwhelming majority of the communist parties. For instance, a resolution of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ceylon frankly pointed out that the erroneous views of the Communist Party of China could do great harm to both the national-liberation movement and the socialist revolution of the proletariat, isolating the national-liberation movement from the international working class and world socialist camp, and disrupting the internal unity of the main current of the world revolutionary process.

The New York Times, which is very familiar with American policy-making, said at the beginning of 1965 that the United States had switched over from the role of "adviser" to that of an active and undisguised participant in the combat operations in South Vietnam, and now felt free to make strikes from the air, sea and land at any targets of its choice in North Vietnam.

This became possible because the US imperialists, in pursuit of their selfish interests, were able to make use of the divisive policy of the Peking

leaders, who opposed the united action of the socialist states.

In connection with the beginning of the war against North Vietnam, Max Frankel, a Washington correspondent of *The New York Times*, pointed out in one of his dispatches that the United States in its policy was making active use of the Soviet-Chinese differences. He noted: "The conflict between the Soviet Union and Communist China has become, for the first time, a major element in United States diplomacy. . . A number of American moves in the crisis have been calculated to take advantage of the split in the Communist ranks despite the lingering fear here that Vietnam may yet drive Moscow and Peking together again. . . Many officials here regard the Moscow-Peking conflict as the best hope of an eventual settlement in Vietnam."

As we see, the United States, not without reason, feared increased Soviet military aid to Vietnam. The *Washington Post*, back in the beginning of March, 1965, commented that the Soviet Union—in keeping with the agreements signed in Hanoi at the time of the visit to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam of Alexei Kosygin, Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers—would, evidently, in the near future deliver surface-to-air missiles to North Vietnam.

While parading slogans making noisy demonstrations allegedly directed against imperialism, the Chinese leaders in reality concentrated all their efforts on fighting the socialist countries, and particularly the Soviet Union, and on fanning international tension. The secret Pentagon Papers, which were made public in June, 1971, show what big hopes were pinned on the divisive policy of the Peking leadership and its campaign against the

Soviet Union by the American imperialists when they laid their schemes for aggression against Vietnam. On March 20, 1964, US President Lyndon Johnson pointed out in a cable to Henry Cabot Lodge, US Ambassador in Saigon, that the Administration expected "a showdown" soon between the Chinese and Soviet Communist Parties, and that "action against the North will be more practicable" after, and not before, such a "showdown".

When, as a result of increased US interference, the situation became much more complicated in South Vietnam in the latter half of 1964, Peking began showering the American imperialists with loud-sounding "warnings", and Vietnam, with promises of assistance. But this was followed by a statement that the People's Republic of China had no intention of taking any major steps in this connection, if immediate danger to China did not arise. Washington was instantly informed of Peking's attitude. At the beginning of August, 1964, the Chinese leaders made the next step, so impatiently awaited by the men in power in Washington. The Central Committee of the Communist Party of China categorically and rudely rejected the invitation in a letter from the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, dated June, 15, 1964, to take part in an international conference. This was a signal of its kind for the American military. After these events the US imperialists staged the now notorious Gulf of Tonkin provocation on August 4, 1964, and began taking practical steps to launch an air war against North Vietnam which, it will be recalled, began in February, 1965.

Such was the first result of the divisive policy of the Mao Tse-tung group, a result which, apparently, was expected in Peking, i.e., the unleashing

of a war of aggression by the United States against Vietnam. To all appearances, the aggression, which began in Vietnam, was needed by Mao Tse-tung as an essential external factor making it easier for him to fight his own opponents inside the country and to assert his anti-Soviet policy. This struggle began openly in 1966 under the guise of the so-called cultural revolution. The developments in those years reaffirmed the fact that Mao Tse-tung always sought to build up (for instance, the conflict in the Taiwan Strait in 1958) or actively use (the Caribbean Crisis in 1962) external factors to make sudden changes in domestic policy in order to consolidate his own power, and to impose his adventurist anti-Soviet policy on others.

In the letter of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China addressed to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, on June 14, 1963, it is pointed out that "upholding and strengthening the unity of the ranks of the international communist movement is the common sacred duty of all the communist and workers' parties"(!), that the general line of the international communist movement "is a line for setting up a broad front of struggle against imperialism and the reactionary forces which are headed by the United States, of which the socialist camp and the international proletariat serve as the core"(!)

All the further actions of the leadership of the Communist Party of China show that it had departed from its declared aims, and had betrayed the interests of the Vietnamese people, and of all the patriots of Indo-China. The leadership of the Communist Party of China flatly turned down the Soviet Union's proposal to form a single front in support of fighting Vietnam. Instead of this, it

began a campaign against the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Soviet Union itself, and against the international communist movement and the national-liberation movement.

THE PEKING LEADERS: THEIR WORDS AND DEEDS

It would seem that aggression against a socialist country should have evoked immediate and strong resistance on the part of Peking, and a readiness to put aside, at least temporarily, ideological differences with the international communist movement and to present a united front. But this, unfortunately, did not take place. Peking came out with thunderous statements condemning US aggression, but took not a single step to act jointly with the other socialist countries. Furthermore, in January, 1965, when the US imperialists were already making intensive preparations for the systematic bombing of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, Mao Tse-tung, through his old friend, Edgar Snow, an American journalist, once again notified Washington that Peking had no intention of becoming involved in the Vietnam war, declaring that "only if the United States attacked China would the Chinese fight".

For their part, the Americans also told the Chinese rulers more than once of their intentions in Vietnam, and told them, in particular, they did not intend to violate the sovereignty of the People's Republic of China. Arthur Goldberg, US Ambassador to the United Nations, mentioned this in his speech at the 21st session of the UN General Assembly on September 22, 1966.

It became clear from the secret papers which

were made public in the United States in June, 1971, that the US representatives made active use of the Warsaw meetings with the Chinese. For instance, on February 24, 1964, the US Ambassador to Poland handed over to the Ambassador of the People's Republic of China a policy statement of the US government on Vietnam, and told him what Washington wanted and did not want. Robert McNamara, US Defence Secretary at the time, spoke frankly on this issue in an interview published in *Enterprise* (September 8, 1964). In reply to a question on the possibility of a war between the United States and China, McNamara emphasised that his country had done everything that was humanly possible to persuade Communist China that it had no reason at all to interfere in the war in Vietnam.

In this connection, it is interesting to look at a brief commentary by Emile Guikovaty of the *Agence France-Presse*, published in Paris on September 6, 1966, with regard to an interview on previous day between Chen Yi, former Foreign Minister of the People's Republic of China, and Japanese MPs. The correspondent emphasised that Chen Yi's statements that "tension in Sino-American relations" would not last for ever, and that neither China nor the United States wished to clash with each other, "may sound strange" against the background of the Hungweipings' anti-Soviet rallies and the Chinese propaganda clamour against American imperialism.

"However, Chen Yi's statement", Emile Guikovaty noted, "evidently confirms the opinion of many observers that China is aggravating its conflict with the Soviet Union in order to pave the way for direct negotiations with the US Government."

Referring to the Sino-American meetings in Warsaw, Emile Guikovaty pointed out that, as claimed by spokesmen of well-informed circles, "the Chinese and US Ambassadors in Warsaw clearly formulated the conditions necessary for preventing a 'clash' between their two countries in Vietnam." For instance US airmen received official orders not to approach the Chinese border, and the Chinese agreed to regard any "errors" which might occur as "unfortunate incidents". In other words, Peking and Washington reached a "gentleman's agreement" of a kind on the demarcation of borderlines in the course of the Vietnamese war.

The true value and political significance now becomes clear of the many "warnings" issued during the years of the Vietnam war in connection with violations of the airspace of the People's Republic of China by US planes. As regards the war in Vietnam, Peking seemed to think that all it had to do was simply to publish "tough" statements and stage noisy propaganda campaigns of condemnation of the American aggression to cover up China's rejection of all proposals for joint action with other socialist countries in support of the struggle of the Vietnamese people.

Even in the early days of the war in Vietnam a big gap appeared between the words and deeds of the Peking leadership with regard to the Vietnam issue. For instance, the statement of the government of the People's Republic of China of August 7, 1965, in connection with the expansion of the American aggression in Vietnam, says that "the 650-million Chinese people have repeatedly voiced their readiness to lend their total support and aid to the Vietnamese people... We warn the American aggressors once again,

that the Chinese people are always as good as their word." The concluding part of this statement emphasises: "Let all the countries and peoples of the world, who cherish peace and stand for justice, *come out as one* (authors's italics), and finally expose the shady game of the United States in the peace talks, give their firm support to the righteous struggle of the Vietnamese people and achieve victory over the American aggressors!"

And so, Peking urged that all the countries and peoples "come out as one" to repulse American aggression, but, at the same time, flatly rejected joint action with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, and obstructed in every possible way the transit of cargoes being shipped from the Soviet Union and other European socialist countries to the patriotic forces of Vietnam. It was precisely at that time—also on August 7, 1965—that Henry Bradsher of the *Associated Press* pointed out in a dispatch from Moscow that the Soviet Union had trained North Vietnamese airmen to fly MIG-21s, Russian jet fighters equal to the US aircraft taking part in raids on North Vietnam.

The double-faced policy of China was likewise noted in this period by US officials. In an interview in August 1965 with Luigi Romers, a correspondent of the Italian weekly, *Il Tempo*, Robert McNamara observed that the Chinese are most belligerent when it comes to making statements and inciting others to rebellion. But up till now, he added, they have proved that they do not want to suit the action to the word.

From the very outset of the aggressive war in Vietnam, the Soviet Union rendered the fighting Vietnamese people extensive aid of all kinds. It

lent them vigorous political support on the international scene, strongly denounced the American aggression, and urged the peoples of the world to extend and strengthen the movement of solidarity with fighting Vietnam. Addressing the September 1965 Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Leonid Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Party's Central Committee, said that the Soviet Union had been carrying out and was continuing to carry out its internationalist duty to the Vietnamese people, that it had been rendering and was continuing to render substantial aid to the Vietnamese comrades. "We have already provided the Democratic Republic of Vietnam with a considerable quantity of weapons and military equipment", he said, and added: "Our line is to go on giving the Democratic Republic of Vietnam whatever aid, both material and political, that it requires to repulse American aggression. We consistently support joint effort by all the fraternal socialist countries to help the Vietnamese people in their fight against aggression of the imperialists."

The representatives of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries repeatedly pointed out that the US imperialists would fail to achieve a military victory in Vietnam, and that there was only one way for them to extricate themselves from their fix, namely, by immediately discontinuing their aggression and giving the Vietnamese people the chance to decide their future for themselves.

Expressing the will of all the Soviet people, the 23rd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, in a specially adopted statement, strongly condemned the aggression of the US im-

perialists against the Vietnamese people, and demanded that the USA stop bombing the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, withdraw all its troops and the troops of its satellites from Vietnam, and stop interfering in the internal affairs of Vietnam. The Congress called "on all communist and workers' parties to work still more persistently for united action in the struggle against US aggression in Vietnam and in rendering effective aid and support to the fighting Vietnamese people."

The Statement of the 23rd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union on Vietnam and its appeal to all the communist and workers' parties for unity of action met with world-wide response.

Hailing the Statement of the Congress, *Nhan Dan*, the official publication of the Central Committee of the Vietnam Workers' Party, noted: "The Statement of the 23rd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union concerning the United States aggression in Vietnam, like the statements on the Vietnam issue of different delegates to the Congress, constitutes energetic and sincere support in keeping with the spirit of proletarian internationalism of the Communist Party and the peoples of the Soviet Union with regard to the Vietnamese people."

All the communist and workers' parties of the world resolutely demanded that an end be put to the aggression in Vietnam, and called for unity of all the revolutionary forces, emphasising that only if there were unity would it be possible to emerge victorious from the struggle against imperialism.

A long article on a "people's war" by Lin Piao, Mao Tse-tung's closest comrade-in-arms (up till the end of 1971 when he fell into disfavour), was

published in China in September, 1965. Basing himself on the experience of the Chinese revolution, Lin Piao urged the underdeveloped countries of the world—the “rural zones”—to encircle the “urban zones” and wage a “protracted war” to inflict a “global defeat” on these “urban zones”. This article was taken throughout the world to be Peking’s instructions to the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America—including, naturally, Vietnam—to apply the strategy and tactics of a “drawn-out people’s war”. Lin Piao urged the patriots of South Vietnam to concentrate their efforts on guerrilla operations, and pointed out that combat operations should be conducted only when there was a numerical superiority of not less than five or six to one over the enemy.

In reply to these recommendations, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam published many articles in 1966 saying that the Vietnamese people had waged a liberation war by their own methods, that they were continuing to do so, and that they had no intention of copying the Chinese experience of a “protracted war”. For instance, Nguyen Chi Thanh, a member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Vietnam Workers’ Party, writing in the magazine, *Hoc tap*, in 1966, said that statements on the need to have an “absolute” numerical superiority over the enemy was “simply guess-work, and not scientific calculation”.

It should be emphasised that the Chinese leadership, while preaching its theory of a “people’s war”, at the same time did not want the implementation of this “theory” in Vietnam to spell any complicated commitments for the People’s Republic of China. This was made quite clear in an article published in the newspaper, *Jenmin*

jihpao, on July 11, 1966, in which Peking said that it would not interfere in the Vietnam war. Although the article pointed out that the People’s Republic of China would go on supporting the patriots of Vietnam, its main content was an appeal to the Vietnamese to rely principally on their own forces in the struggle against the US imperialists and their puppets. The article emphasised that “People should and can only rely on themselves to make revolution and wage people’s war in their country, since these are their own affairs.” In conclusion, the newspaper—not for the first time, and with no right at all to do so—declared that the Vietnamese patriots “will continue firmly to rely on their own strength”. This obviously was one more attempt to isolate Vietnam from assistance of the USSR and other socialist countries.

No wonder that the *Washington Post* noted that “Peking’s vows to help Hanoi, while louder in tone, have grown more ambiguous within recent months”, and that this restraint had caused observers in the Far East to express the hesitation that “the Chinese are prepared to fight to the last Vietnamese.”

Thus, the articles on Indo-China, which were published in the Chinese press in 1965-1966, showed—in the general opinion of observers—that Lin Piao’s much-publicised article, in conformity with Mao Tse-tung’s “theory”, urging a worldwide “people’s war”, was in reality advice from Peking to the world national-liberation movement not to rely on outside help.

The official statements made by representatives of the People’s Republic of China completely convinced Washington as early as mid-1966 that China would do nothing to overcome her diffe-

rences with the world revolutionary movement and to build up united action on the Vietnam issue.

This view was further strengthened after Chen Yi's discussion with Japanese MPs in the beginning of September, 1966. The *Washington Evening Star*, on September 9, 1966, said that US officials were more convinced than ever before that Red China would stand aside from the war in Vietnam, and that if Johnson was deeply concerned over the possible entry of Red Chinese into the war after the start of the dramatic escalation of the war in Vietnam in February, 1965, then that concern had already been completely dispersed by the Chinese leaders.

Receiving a free hand, the American imperialists increased the scale of their bombing in North Vietnam. In 1966, US warplanes attacked many industrial targets in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and also inhabited areas, which led to additional casualties and inflicted heavy material damage on North Vietnam.

In spite of the stepped-up bombing of North Vietnam and the difficulties encountered by the Vietnamese people in repulsing the American aggression, Peking, pursuing its divisive policy, did everything possible to hold up the passage of Soviet military aid through the territory of China.

From 1966, when the so-called cultural revolution swept across the whole country like a tidal wave, conditions for the transportation of Soviet cargoes through China became still more complicated. Under different pretexts, the Chinese dragged out endlessly the negotiations on the transit of freight from the USSR and other European socialist countries. For instance, negotiations on the transit of goods in 1967 continued for five months (1)

And the situation was the same in subsequent years. This showed up the real value of the countless assertions by official representatives of the People's Republic of China, and of Peking propaganda, on their readiness to do everything "worthy of a great rear".

It is difficult to imagine the humiliations and mockery which had to be endured by the Soviet people accompanying the trainloads of Soviet military supplies and other goods shipped to fighting Vietnam. In the period of 1965-1968, each such trainload moved across the territory of China, from the Soviet-Chinese border to the Sino-Vietnamese border, with great difficulty. The railway wagons were frequently plastered with anti-Soviet slogans; big anti-Soviet demonstrations were staged at many stations, including the border stations of Manchuria and Pinhsien; Soviet citizens, accompanying the trains, were not allowed to leave their wagons, and unidentified hooligans tore off the seals and stole large quantities of freight and the bills of lading.

In April, 1965, the Soviet side proposed to the Chinese side that a top-level meeting of representatives of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union be held to discuss the question of taking united action in defending North Vietnam. This proposal was flatly rejected by the Chinese leaders.

In October, 1965, the Soviet side again sent a letter to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China demanding that the obstacles deliberately hampering the transit of Soviet goods across the territory of China to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, be removed. However, Peking turned down this demand of

the Soviet side, too, although earlier, in February of that year, the leaders of the People's Republic of China had given assurances that they would ensure unimpeded transit for Soviet military aid to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.*

The world press, both communist and non-communist, spoke indignantly of the obstacles planted by the Chinese in the way of Soviet supplies. For instance, the Swiss newspaper, *La Tribune de Lausanne*, noted on August 17, 1965, in reference to the policy of the People's Republic of China towards the Vietnamese issue and the struggle of the Vietnamese people, that such a practice, which ignores the wish of the 30 million Vietnamese, exposes Peking's desire to cause discord. The French newspaper, *Le Monde*, said on September 11, 1966, "Since the Chinese have been obstructing the transit of Soviet supplies to Vietnam, a large number of Soviet transports have collected in the port of Haiphong."

The United Press International agency reported on April 12, 1967, that China was holding up and sabotaging deliveries of goods from the Soviet Union to Hanoi by rail. A correspondent of this agency pointed out in his dispatch that, as

* It will be appropriate here to add that, in reply to the Soviet proposal on discontinuing open polemics (this proposal had earlier been advanced many times and had always been rejected by Peking), Mao Tse-tung stated that polemics were simply a "paper war", that no lives were lost in it, and that it could therefore go on for ten thousand years! But four years later, this "paper war" developed into an armed provocation by the Maoists on the Soviet-Chinese border, as a result of which Soviet frontier guards lost their lives as well as brain-washed Chinese soldiers, who attacked those whose fathers and older brothers had shed their blood in defending the Chinese revolution.

a result of lengthy negotiations with Soviet representatives, China had agreed to stop blocking the delivery of Soviet military supplies to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. This agency—like other Western agencies (because only their correspondents were permitted to travel round China)—also reported that the Chinese were stealing equipment, removing certain parts of intricate missiles, and even replacing new fighter aircraft with obsolete makes, and, at the same time, were trying to accuse the Soviet Union of not sending enough aid to fighting Vietnam.

In its statement in September, 1966, in connection with the situation in Vietnam, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Japan noted: "The actual situation in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam is such that there is no alternative to relying on assistance, chiefly from the socialist countries, in obtaining modern weapons, including aircraft, and anti-aircraft guns and missiles." However, the statement emphasized that the Chinese claimed that the object of Soviet aid was "to force the Vietnamese to rely on it to such a great degree that, in the long run, they would have to give in to Soviet pressure and agree to negotiations on any terms with the United States." This "completely negative" attitude towards Soviet aid, the Japanese Communists pointed out, logically leads to the demand that the Soviet Union stop its help to Vietnam. But this was the same as "urging the Vietnamese people to continue with 'protracted' war, and at the same time demanding that they reject Soviet aid." This was exactly what the demands of the Peking leaders really meant.

This position was expressed not only by the Japanese Communists, but also by the great ma-

jority of the fraternal communist and workers' parties, who saw what tremendous damage was being done to the struggle of the Vietnamese people by the divisive policy of the leadership of the People's Republic of China. However, the Peking leaders refused to heed the voice of reason, to heed the warnings being made in all parts of the world.

Strangely enough, the true state of affairs was quite accurately reflected in *The New York Times*, which, on April 3, 1966, stated that "the fear (of the Peking leaders—Y.M.) is not of a seepage of influence from the United States, but of revisionist ideas prevalent in that so-called neo-capitalist society, the Soviet Union, which could lead weaklings to accept peaceful co-existence with the West... In terms of basic objectives (of the Chinese leadership—Y.M.), which include attainment of pre-eminence in Asia... and seizure of leadership of the Communist bloc in competition with the Soviet Union, no major policy changes (in Peking—Y.M.) are expected."

This was said by a newspaper, which can hardly be suspected of sympathising with communism, and which is obviously interested in widening the split in the socialist camp. One could have expected that, in reply to this assertion—as to hundreds of similar ones voiced by the Western press—Peking would firmly declare that the American imperialists would never see their wish come true—their wish that the split between Peking and the international communist movement would deepen still further. However, by their actions and also the large number of anti-Soviet articles published in the Chinese press in the course of these years, the Chinese leaders corroborated the correctness of such comments, and displayed rea-

diness to go to all lengths to achieve their hegemonic and chauvinistic aims.

Peking propaganda used a lot of words in its efforts to prove China's active and uncompromising support of the revolutionary movement throughout the world. But nowhere in Chinese press and radio statements is it possible to find strong words of condemnation of the British and Portuguese colonialists who rule in Hong Kong (Hsiang Kang) and Macao (Aomen). Whereas it roundly condemns colonialism when other countries are concerned, Peking propaganda shows surprising indifference towards the fate of its compatriots living under colonial rule in those areas. Peking's insincerity and demagoguery are clearly manifested in this matter: its representatives have more than once hypocritically declared that Hong Kong is "an exception".

According to the British newspaper, *Financial Times*, Hong Kong imports half of the food it needs from continental China, and this, in turn, makes up one-half of all of Hong Kong's imports from the People's Republic of China. Stocks of raw materials and semi-manufactured goods come next, after foodstuffs. In addition, large quantities of heroin and morphine reach Hong Kong from China in different ways. Even in 1967, at the height of the "cultural revolution", Hong Kong imports from China fell only to the 1965 level. But in subsequent years, according to the *Financial Times*, "Peking's financial and commercial apparatus in the Colony (Hong Kong—Y.M.) has done its best to repair the self-inflicted wounds which resulted from the Communist violence of 1967."

The *Financial Times* believes that revenues gained by China from Hong Kong now come to

about 600 million US dollars a year. What talk can there be about a class struggle when making money comes first?

As a result of the penetration of foreign capital, primarily American, and of active ties with China, the economy of Hong Kong is developing rapidly. "Paradoxically", says the *Financial Times*, "it was the advent of a Communist regime in Peking which gave the city its biggest chance."

Hong Kong is needed by Peking not only as a source of foreign currency, but also as the best way of spreading its propaganda, particularly anti-Soviet literature, to different countries of the world.

In the years of American aggression in Vietnam, Hong Kong gradually turned into one of the main places where US servicemen, "tired out" from fighting the patriots in South Vietnam, could "relax". Hong-Kong's 20-odd hotels were booked up practically throughout the period of 1966-1968. As was pointed out by *The New York Times*, the factors contributing to the flourishing of Hong Kong were its own charm, its abundance of hotels, and the influx of American servicemen on leave from action in Vietnam. The paper did not give the number of US servicemen coming to Hong Kong, but mentioned that they spent up to two million dollars a month there. The Hong Kong press claims that the income from these American visitors is about 500 million dollars a year. According to statistics from this same source, in 1968 alone, Hong Kong was visited by 200,000 US officers and men, including 120,000 seamen and airmen of the US 7th Fleet, the strike force of the aggressors in Indo-China, while in 1969, as many as 185,000 US servicemen spent

their leave in this exotic spot. It makes no difference to the owners of the banks (quite a few of them are Chinese), of the many bar-rooms, shops and nightspots where their guests come from, so long as they have money to spend. It has been estimated by the local newspapers, *Wen Hwei Pao* and *Ta Kung Pao*, that US warships made 344 calls in Hong Kong in 1965 and 390 in 1966. In 1968 Hong Kong was even the host of the US nuclear aircraft-carrier, "Enterprise".

According to foreign press reports, the US naval command constantly buys from Peking-controlled firms in Hong Kong different types of equipment as well as meat, vegetables and other food-stuffs for US troops in countries of Indo-China.

No wonder that *The New York Times* noted with satisfaction that in Hong Kong the red flag of Communist China is fluttering next to the Stars and Stripes of the USA, that nowhere else in the world have China and the West mingled so successfully and completely. Evidently, for this reason, Peking, even at the height of the "cultural revolution", never spoke of prohibiting units of the US 7th Fleet from calling at Hong Kong. The principal demand made at a rally on July 18, 1967, by Hsieh Fu-chin, Minister of Public Security of the People's Republic of China, was that "compatriots in Hsiang Kang" should have the "sacred, inviolable right... to study, popularise, apply and uphold the ideas of Mao Tse-tung."

The main thing, it seems, is to "popularise" Mao's "ideas", whereas the fact that Hong Kong has been converted into a big resort where the US military can relax and enjoy themselves there after their barbarous operations against the pat-

riots of Indo-China, is of secondary importance. The British newspaper, *Sunday Telegraph*, had good reason to comment in May, 1969, that the Chinese dragon lay peacefully and advantageously in Victoria harbour alongside of the "toothless lion".

The Foreign Ministry of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam came out with a statement on March 23, 1967, once again condemning the British Government for "allowing the US imperialists to use Hong Kong as a base for aggression against Vietnam, and for permitting US warships and warplanes, involved in the war against the Vietnamese people, to call at the port of Hong Kong and use its airfield. The statement pointed out that in the beginning of 1967 alone, more than 70 US warships called at the port of Hong Kong.

Peking adopted a formal attitude towards this, by no means the first, statement of this kind by the government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. The Foreign Ministry of the People's Republic of China sent a note to the British Embassy in China expressing its "strong protest" in this connection, and that was as far as it went. This brings to mind Mao Tse-tung's favourite saying: "Sitting on a hill and watching the tigers fight".

When, in 1969, the Chinese military carried out a provocative operation on the Soviet border, the Syrian newspaper, *Nidal al-Shaab*, justly observed that "it is not at all a matter of borders or 'annexed' Chinese lands. If this were so, the Mao Tse-tung group would have thought, first of all, of the liberation of the island of Taiwan, which nobody denies as belonging to China, and which is ruled by the Americans together with their ac-

complices—the Chinese reactionaries—or of the liberation of Hong Kong, a Chinese territory converted by the British into their Far Eastern naval and air-force base, and which the United States is using as a bridgehead against Vietnam, and which world imperialism has turned into a market for American, British and West German commodities and an international gold-speculating exchange."

Curious relations have likewise developed between the People's Republic of China and the Portuguese colony of Macao, which is almost totally dependent on China for food and water supplies, and which is of no economic importance for the parent country.

The main role in these relations belongs to Ho Ying who is an excellent mediator. On the one hand, he is a member of the Political Consultative Council in Peking, and, on the other, a member of the Legislative Council of Macao. Ho Ying is a well-known personality in this area. He is the principal owner of four banks, five hotels and two newspapers, as well as all the cinemas of Macao and various other property. He is also one of the main dealers in gold.

Evidently, for these reasons, as the Lebanese newspaper, *Daily Star*, said in the beginning of 1967, the leadership in Peking ignores the facts that President Salazar of Portugal is a dictator, that there are no diplomatic relations between China and Portugal, that Ho Ying is a capitalist who lends generous aid to anti-communist refugees cared for by Catholic organisations, and that Macao is a centre where gambling-houses are running a prosperous business, dealing in gold is carried on, and intelligence agencies organise their activities. But Macao pays for its purchases

in China in "hard currency", and that is the main thing.

This was precisely why Peking made it perfectly clear that it does not want to change the status quo either in Hong Kong or Macao.

The Danish newspaper, *Politiken*, noted with surprise, in January, 1967, that one could still understand Portugal wishing to cling to its colonial possessions, but "what the devil is prodding China into complicity with one of the most reactionary states of Europe?"

While rallying the Vietnamese people to resist aggression, the Vietnam Workers' Party and the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam at the same time took vigorous steps to expand international support for their just cause. Addressing the celebration meeting devoted to the 21st anniversary of the formation of the republic, Prime Minister Pham Van Dong said: "The present great war of resistance of our people against American aggression and for national salvation is an integral part of the revolutionary struggle of all the working people and oppressed nations of the world against US imperialism. It is part of the struggle for peace, national independence, democracy and socialism." In this connection, Pham Van Dong said: "The peoples of the socialist countries, the international working class, the national-liberation movement and the peace-loving peoples of the entire world should unite in a common front and wage a resolute struggle for an end to this dirty war." He particularly noted that "the great Soviet Union always takes its stand on our side."

On the same day, speaking at a reception in Peking on the occasion of the national holiday of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, Chen Yi

declared that the struggle of the Vietnamese people "is a great cause which is part of the revolutionary struggle of all the peoples of the world against American imperialism." However, he immediately went on in a slightly disguised way to accuse the Soviet Union of "flirting with American imperialism" and of helping it in its attempts to impose peace negotiations on the Democratic Republic of Vietnam "by means of bombing". Earlier, addressing a rally in Peking, Kuo Mo-jo, Vice-Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress of China, even went so far as to state that the Soviet Union had become "the No. 1 accomplice of American imperialism... and, in spite of everything, is betraying the interests of the Vietnamese people and is serving American imperialism in every possible way."

The leaders of fighting Vietnam, knowing better than anyone else how much military and economic aid was coming from the Soviet Union, were highly appreciative of this assistance, but the Peking leaders tried in every conceivable way to smear the Soviet Union's stand and aid to fighting Vietnam. No wonder that the Israeli newspaper, *Lamethav*, said in May, 1967, that "Mao-Tse-tung and his group are anxious to keep the flames of hostility towards the USSR from dying out and for the West not to forget for a moment that the Chinese regard the 'Soviet revisionists' as the main enemies of China... The Chinese are doing everything possible to convince the Americans that China has no intention of interfering directly in the Vietnam war, and regards the USSR as its main enemy."

This policy of the Chinese leadership was strongly condemned by the majority of the communist

and workers' parties and representatives of the national-liberation movement. A statement by the Lebanese Communist Party, published in the newspaper, *Al-Akbar*, emphasised: "The Chinese leaders are trying to make the hostile anti-Soviet line to which they have adhered for a long time the official policy of the state, the Party and the entire Chinese people. . . . The most dangerous manifestation of this divisive policy is the stubborn rejection by the Chinese leadership of the proposal of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and other fraternal parties to pool their efforts in the common struggle against the American aggression in Vietnam. . . . The statements made by the party and government leaders of China to the whole world on their flat rejection of joint action with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, with the communist and workers' parties, and with other anti-imperialist forces of the world in the matter of rendering assistance to the Vietnamese people in their bitter struggle against the aggressors, means in reality that these leaders refuse to support the heroic people of Vietnam in their fight against the aggression of the world's biggest imperialist power. The Chinese leaders are hampering in every possible way the ever-growing military and economic aid to Vietnam on the part of the socialist countries, and especially the Soviet Union. The Lebanese Communists, like the overwhelming majority of Communists of the world, consider that the disgraceful stand taken by the Chinese leadership in this vital issue is a big obstacle to a unified policy of all the socialist countries who seek to put an end as quickly as possible to the savage American aggression in Vietnam. This stand is doing tremendous damage to the interests of the Vietna-

mese people and world socialism. It is rendering a great service to American imperialism and to all the enemies of socialism, peace and progress."

Throughout all the years in which the bombing of North Vietnam continued, Peking came out with clamorous statements denouncing the aggressive war of the United States in Vietnam, but at the same time constantly obstructed the further unity of the revolutionary forces supporting fighting Vietnam, and regularly made it clear to Washington that the US imperialists could, without fear, continue to do whatever they pleased in Vietnam. In an article, devoted to the congress of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany (held in April, 1967), the newspaper, *Jenmin jihpao*, frankly declared: "Naturally, under no circumstances shall we agree to *united action* (author's italics). . . . This is how the matter stands. . . ." The Peking leaders, and they alone, bear the responsibility for the lack of unity in the ranks of the anti-imperialist forces, and for the considerable damage done to the just cause of the Vietnamese people. On October 16, 1966, Alexei Kosygin, Head of the Soviet Government, noted that if American imperialism had come up against the joint resistance of all the socialist countries, against a unified policy, then its outrages in Vietnam would have undoubtedly been stopped and its aggression curbed in a very short time. "The posture of China", Prime Minister Kosygin added, "has become a serious obstacle in the struggle for this just cause."

During all these years the Soviet Union tried to unite the efforts of all the socialist countries and China for support of the struggle of the Vietnamese people. And in spite of the difficulties caused by the Chinese authorities, the Soviet

Union continued to send to Vietnam everything that was needed to fight the foreign invaders.

In January, 1967, the magazine, *U.S. News & World Report*, in two successive issues, spoke with alarm about the substantial and ever-increasing aid of the Soviet Union to Vietnam. It noted that Russia was providing 75 per cent of foreign military aid to North Vietnam. It further pointed out: "The Russians use ships to transport 80 per cent of their aid to North Vietnam, the balance going by rail or by plane across Red China despite severe restrictions set up by Peking. All told, the Russians are said to be delivering 80,000 tons of goods a month to Hanoi. . .

"The Russians, when possible, avoid shipping vital items across Red China. One reason, according to intelligence sources: the Chinese insist on opening all shipments crossing their territory, often stamping 'From China With Love' over the Russian characters.

"Reports are heard also that the Chinese have delayed shipments of SAMs and late-model MIGs, while their technicians removed them from their crates to make copies for themselves."

The magazine further emphasised that, along with military aid, the Soviet Union was continuing to give extensive non-military assistance to North Vietnam. It said: "The North Vietnamese war machine runs almost entirely on Russian oil. In the past 18 months, the Russians have shipped in 300,000 metric tons. The Chinese have provided almost none. . ."

Addressing the joint jubilee meeting of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and the RSFSR on November 3, 1967, Leonid Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central

Committee of the Communist Party, noted: "Displaying heroism which evokes the admiration of the whole world and overcoming tremendous difficulties, the Vietnamese people are repulsing the hordes of the interventionists and dealing them blow after blow. In doing so they have the support of progressive peace-loving forces throughout the world and primarily the constant extensive assistance of the Soviet Union and other socialist states. Weapons, munitions, food, clothes, transport facilities and equipment are all concrete manifestations of the solidarity of the socialist countries which are helping the Vietnamese people in their heroic struggle.

"The military successes of the Vietnamese people would have been still more significant had it not been for the stand of Mao Tse-tung's group which hampers co-ordinated assistance to Vietnam from all socialist countries, including China. We regret that the Peking leaders have taken this line. For its part, the Soviet Union is fully resolved to render every assistance and support to the fraternal Vietnamese people who are fighting for their just cause. This assistance will continue until the American imperialists stop their shameful and criminal venture and get out of Vietnam."

The Soviet Union's internationalist stand has been, and continues to be, highly appreciated not only by the patriots of Indo-China, but also by all those who are fighting for national liberation and even by those, who, while not sympathising with the ideas of socialism and communism, nevertheless approve of the position taken by the socialist countries regarding Vietnam. For instance, the French capitalist newspaper, *La Croix*, said on January, 3, 1967, that many Americans were still labouring under the delusion that the Sino-Soviet

discord would enable them to wrest concessions from the Kremlin at the expense of Vietnam. They were thinking in vain that the USSR would sacrifice the vital interests of its Hanoi friends.

The newspaper, *Rodong Shinmoon*, put out by the Central Committee of the Working People's Party of Vietnam, commented in August, 1966: "Taking advantage of the weakening of the unity of the international communist movement, the American imperialists are exerting frantic efforts to make their dream of world domination come true. Therefore, the absence of unity in the international communist movement cannot but have a harmful effect in some degree on the development of the world situation... we must put all our spears of offensive together, aim them at the American aggressors, and rebuff them collectively". The paper went to urge that the topmost effort be exerted to build up a "united front against American imperialism in lending assistance to the Vietnamese people. This assistance is the main and immediate task of the socialist camp and the international communist movement. At the present moment, this aid serves as an indicator of loyalty to the principles of Marxism-Leninism and fulfilment of internationalist duty."

Pursuing an anti-Soviet political line, and conducting a "cultural revolution" in the country, the Peking leaders, preoccupied with domestic problems, endeavoured throughout the whole period of the war in Vietnam to do everything they could to avoid any worsening of their relations with the United States. This was obvious to all observers who were carefully following developments in that part of the world. The well-known French writer, Geneviève Tabouis, in an article in the newspaper, *Paris-Jour*, in September, 1966,

expressed the opinion that Washington believed that the American escalation could continue, and that Peking would not come to the aid of Hanoi as long as China did not feel herself to be in any immediate danger. Tabouis considered that that was the tacit understanding existing between the Americans and Chinese upon which US strategy placed increasing reliance.

Ruling circles in the United States could not but express satisfaction with Peking's policy. The US newspaper, *Christian Science Monitor*, stated that Washington was pleased that divergences of this kind continued to exist between two big Communist centres of power. So long as the Chinese attitude to the USSR persisted there was no possibility of joint Communist efforts being made with regard to Vietnam. A clearer way could hardly be found of telling what Washington wanted and what it had gained from the Chinese leaders.

But the American imperialists failed, and Peking's efforts to split the socialist community and subordinate the world communist movement to the hegemonic interests of Mao Tse-tung's group suffered a total defeat. The Maoists failed to isolate Vietnam from the socialist camp, and the Vietnamese patriots received all-round aid and support both from the Soviet Union and other socialist countries and the whole of the international communist and national-liberation movements. The heroic Vietnamese people, relying on the assistance of the socialist countries, and particularly the Soviet Union, and on the moral and political support of all the peace-loving forces, dealt a crushing blow at the aggressor and forced him, in November, 1968, to stop unconditionally the bombing of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam

and sit down at the negotiation table in Paris. This was a great military and political victory for the Vietnamese people and gladdened the hearts of all their friends.

But it was a turn of events which did not gladden the men in power in Peking. They continued their efforts to whip up international tension, and almost openly voiced displeasure at the consent of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam to hold talks in Paris. This did not suit the Peking leaders who wanted to convert Vietnam and the whole of Indo-China into a proving-ground for "Mao Tse-tung's ideas" and his theory of a "protracted people's war", and they tried to bring pressure to bear on the Democratic Republic of Vietnam to prevent the start of the Paris talks. When, in spite of their wishes, these negotiations got under way, they deliberately maintained an almost total suppression of news about Vietnam. Throughout the whole of 1968, only a few reports on the events in Vietnam were published in the Chinese press and then in the most inconspicuous places. Western observers who carefully followed the Chinese press estimated that in this period the news coverage of events in Vietnam was only a fraction of what it had been in the previous period, whereas anti-Soviet stories continued to be splashed on the front pages. Chinese propaganda continued to smear Soviet foreign policy and Soviet aid to fighting Vietnam.

It is appropriate to mention here that *Nhan Dan*, the official publication of the Central Committee of the Working People's Party of Vietnam, noted in an editorial in connection with the signing in Moscow of new agreements on aid to be given to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam in 1969: "The support and assistance of the So-

viet Union with regard to the revolutionary struggle of our people has always been enormous, valuable and effective. The Soviet Union fervently supported our people during the war of resistance against the French colonialists. It rendered fraternal economic and technical aid to our people in the building of socialism in North Vietnam. And it is actively helping and supporting our people in the war against the American aggressors in South Vietnam and in repulsing their destructive aggression against North Vietnam. The great victories of our army and people are closely connected with the continuously increasing support and aid of the Soviet Union." The article went on to say that support and aid for Vietnam had become a wide-spread and constantly growing mass movement in the Soviet Union, in which all sections of the Soviet people were taking part. The internationalist spirit of the Soviet people in relation to the struggle of the Vietnamese people is demonstrated in "Solidarity-with-Vietnam" weeks and "Support-for-Vietnam" days, and other undertakings such as a nation-wide drive for the fastest possible output of goods for Vietnam.

It should be noted here that each country conducted its campaign of solidarity with fighting Vietnam in its own way, and it became a fine tradition in the Soviet Union and other socialist countries to hold "Solidarity-with-Vietnam" weeks, etc., and to collect funds for Vietnam, and do other things in conformity with the decisions of the World Peace Council and with the decisions of their respective national public organisations. But nothing of the kind happened in China. Even on the national holidays of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, friendship rallies and meetings of working people were rarely held. But

anti-Soviet rallies were by no means infrequent.

In spite of the obstacles put in their way by the Chinese authorities, the patriots of Vietnam, with the help of the Soviet Union and other socialist states and all the peace-loving forces of the world achieved big successes in the struggle against American aggression. However, a relaxation of tension in Indo-China was obviously not a part of the strategic calculations of Mao Tse-tung's group. This is the only possible explanation for the Chinese press saying practically nothing in that period about one of the most important international issues—the struggle of the Vietnamese people—even though the eyes of the whole world were on it. Many observers, after Lin Piao's report at the Ninth Congress of the Communist Party of China, came to the conclusion that the Paris talks and the struggle of the Vietnamese people were apparently taboo and that the Vietnam problem was actually being hushed up in the People's Republic of China.

The West German newspaper, *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, commenting on this situation, noted that Vietnam "comes in for only two and a half lines, testifying to the stiff resistance with which the US-North Vietnam talks in Paris continue to meet in Peking." Washington, like the rest of the world, took note of the fact that the Ninth Congress of the Communist Party of China advanced the struggle against the Soviet Union and other socialist countries as the most important aspect of Peking's foreign policy. The Congress clearly demonstrated Peking's desire to undermine at all costs the efforts of the Soviet Union and the socialist camp on the international scene, making use of any means towards this end, including the Vietnam issue and Soviet aid to the heroic strug-

gle of the patriots of Vietnam. The world press noted that Mao Tse-tung's group remained bitterly opposed to the establishment of a single front against American aggression in Vietnam. The Bulgarian newspaper, *Rabotnichesko Delo*, pointed out that "the many efforts to unite the forces of the socialist countries and the communist parties in rendering aid to Vietnam, have always come up against the opposition of the Peking leadership."

Peking's attitude towards the Vietnam problem also found striking expression in the fact that the Ninth Congress of the Communist Party of China did not even deem it necessary to adopt any special decision on this issue, although all the meetings of the fraternal communist and workers' parties which took place in that period, including the 23rd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, devoted great attention to this vital international question.

Such is the true worth of Peking's sham internationalism and the numerous statements by its representatives. In reality, the divisive, undermining policy of Mao Tse-tung's group, in both its essence and purpose, fits in completely with the stand of the most extreme Right-wing forces in the world. And those reactionary forces make use of this policy of the Chinese leadership in their fight against the countries of the socialist community and the international communist and national-liberation movements.

Peking's policy was the greatest obstacle to a speedy achievement of victory by the Vietnamese people in their just struggle for the liberation of Vietnam from the American aggressors and their puppets.

"PING-PONG IS AN INTERESTING GAME"

The spring of 1971 brought with it many surprises for all those following the foreign policy moves of the Peking leadership.

In 1969-1970, China began changing its tactics in relation to the countries of Indo-China. This is explained quite simply. Right up to the end of 1968, the Peking leaders did not give up hope, firstly, of the possibility of the adoption by the peoples of Indo-China of the Maoist "theory" of a "protracted people's war", and, secondly, of being able themselves, in one way or another, to steer the United States and the Soviet Union onto a collision course, while sitting on a hill themselves and "watching the tigers fight". But these hopes did not materialise. The people of Vietnam decided to act in a different way: parallel with their armed struggle, they launched a vigorous political and diplomatic campaign with the support of all the progressive forces of the world, and forced the US imperialists to sit down at the negotiation table.

The United States gradually began pulling its troops out of South Vietnam. The leaders of the People's Republic of China could not help but see that the peoples of Indo-China, despite Chinese pressure, were following the road of struggle for national liberation, and rejecting Peking's prescriptions. In this situation, Mao Tse-tung's group had no option but to change its tactics (while preserving its old strategic aims) and announce its support for the Paris talks.

As part of these tactical manoeuvres, Chou En-lai, Premier of the People's Republic of China, paid an official visit to the Democratic Republic

of Vietnam in the beginning of March, 1971. As was pointed out by foreign observers, the purpose of this visit was that, when the invasion of Laos by US-Saigon troops would take place, and when the US ruling circles would threaten to resume the bombing of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, Chou En-lai would show, on that day, that China would not remain indifferent in the event of the Americans carrying out their threat. Speaking in Hanoi on March 5, the Premier of the People's Republic of China declared that the expansion by American imperialism of the aggressive war on the Indo-Chinese peninsula "spells grave danger to China. The government of China and the Chinese people have duly evaluated the folly and adventurism of American imperialism, and are fully prepared for this." Chou En-lai did not fail to declare once more that the 700 million Chinese people are a "firm support of the Vietnamese people", and that the extensive territory of China is a "reliable rear of the Vietnamese people".

These warnings, however, did not disturb the men in power in Washington. Referring to Chou En-lai's statements in Hanoi, US Secretary of State Rogers said on March 9 that he did not think that Chou En-lai had any apprehensions on the score that the United States might be interested in any actions against Communist China.

Commenting on the attitude of the People's Republic of China to US aggression, James Reston said in *The New York Times* on March 19: "Officials in Washington regard these vague threats and promises more as propaganda and psychological warfare than anything else." At the same time, the Chinese, as before, continued to rail against the So-

viet Union for its "collusion" with the United States and "insufficient aid" to Vietnam.

Chou En-lai had hardly returned home from Hanoi when the world was startled by the news that, after a long period of hostility towards the United States, the leadership of the People's Republic of China had suddenly invited a group of US newsmen and sportsmen to come in April to their country for an unofficial table-tennis competition. Western commentators immediately christened this step of the government of the People's Republic of China as "ping-pong diplomacy". Indeed, what would appear to be an ordinary visit by a team of sportsmen acquired considerable political significance. Despite being very busy, the Premier of the People's Republic of China found time to receive the Americans and even enjoy a friendly talk with them on Sino-US relations. He described this visit as a "revival of US-Chinese friendship". Washington welcomed this gesture, which reaffirmed the view expounded by officials of the US Administration that Chou En-lai's threats in Hanoi, which had been levelled at the United States, were simply propaganda aimed at misleading world public opinion.

In return, the United States adopted a programme of easing restrictions on trade with the People's Republic of China, on reciprocal visits, and on the operations of US oil companies supplying fuel to ships and planes going to and from China—with the exception of those ships and aircraft of the People's Republic of China, or chartered by China, which were engaged in delivering cargoes to the People's Republic of China.

Commenting on the reciprocal gestures of Washington and Peking, *The New York Times* observed with satisfaction in its editorial on April 15,

1971: "The Chinese have been most obliging in their timing, since Premier Chou's words about 'a new page in the relations of the Chinese and American peoples' come just as the spring push has begun for marches on Washington by critics of Mr. Nixon's Vietnam policy. Premier Chou has done Mr. Nixon a good turn."

Naturally, the Chinese leadership had to back up this gesture to the United States with some fresh action. Peking supplied this without further delay: another anti-Soviet campaign was launched in the People's Republic of China. This was supposed to show the USA that the Soviet Union was still Peking's main enemy, whereas there were no acute issues which could not be discussed with the Americans.

Commenting on Peking's diplomatic steps, the West German newspaper, *Kölner Stadt-Anzeiger*, noted in an article appearing under the characteristic heading: "The Policy of a Smiling Third Party": "Ever since Mao said 'Welcome!' to the American sportsmen, different assumptions have been made with regard to the motives prompting Peking to change its policy in relation to the Americans." The paper proceeded to give its own explanation for this change: "The main reasons for Peking's readiness for a dialogue with the Americans, it is believed, are the course of developments in Indo-China, and relations with the Soviet Union..." which, in the opinion of the paper, "are only outwardly not so tense". Chinese diplomats in the West, the paper emphasised, have on more than one occasion made it clear that "it is the Russians, and not the Americans, who are China's real enemy."

As was shown by subsequent events, "ping-pong diplomacy" was a well-worked-out scheme

in advance by both sides and was a new step in the development of relations between the People's Republic of China and the United States of America. This was confirmed in July, 1971, when, during his Asian tour, President Nixon's personal adviser, Henry Kissinger, unexpectedly showed up in Peking and spent more than 20 hours in a discussion with Chou En-lai on the whole range of Sino-American relations. An announcement of this visit was made in the Chinese and American press only after Kissinger's departure from Peking. Evidently, at that time, both the People's Republic of China and the United States still had reasons to conceal from the world public the top-level contacts between Peking and Washington. One of the reasons, most probably, was that the Kissinger-Chou En-lai dialogue took place to the accompaniment of the US bombing in South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. Therefore, it was not exactly timely for China, who for such a long time had been giving voice to ultra-revolutionary appeals, to show its cards straight away in its relations with the United States. The Americans and the Peking leaders chose a good time for Kissinger's visit. It will be remembered that, on July 1, 1971, the delegation of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam at the Paris talks advanced a new, seven-point plan aimed at achieving an early settlement of the conflict in Vietnam in the interests of the Vietnamese people. This new, important initiative of the South Vietnamese patriots, supported by the representatives of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, was welcomed by the world public at large. The US Administration found itself in a complicated situation, driven into a corner by this move of the representatives of

fighting Vietnam. It was necessary to give an answer, but they were unable to do so.

And, in this difficult period for Washington, the men in Peking tossed a life-line out to the Americans. The simultaneous announcement in both capitals of Kissinger's visit to the People's Republic of China and of his lengthy talks with Chou En-lai had, in the opinion of most foreign observers, the effect of a bomb shell. Many US and European papers said that the visit of the high-ranking US official to Peking distracted the attention of the world from the seven-point programme and considerably weakened its political and propaganda significance. The men in Washington must have truly been grateful to the leaders of the People's Republic of China for this highly important service.

The following political steps taken by both sides (Nixon's lifting of the embargo on the sale of a number of commodities to the People's Republic of China, the permission of the US authorities to American citizens to visit China, a considerable reduction in the volume of anti-American statements in the Chinese press against a background of intensified anti-Soviet propaganda, etc.) pointed to the beginning of a new stage in Sino-American relations. This was made quite clear by the visit (not secret this time) of Kissinger to Peking in October, 1971, and his meeting with Chou En-lai, and the subsequent announcement in Peking and Washington of President Nixon's forthcoming visit to China.

This announcement caused considerable surprise throughout the world, although it would seem that there was nothing out of the way in the desire of two independent states to establish normal relations between themselves in confor-

mity with generally-accepted principles of international practice. However, there was an important feature in this case—namely, that while wishing to develop relations with the United States, Peking was betraying the interests of the national-liberation movement. It was not accidental that *The New York Times*, commenting on Nixon's pending visit to China, said on August 11, 1971, that North Vietnam was among the countries troubled by the possibility of closer relations between China and the United States. Indeed, the Sino-American contacts and Peking's vigorous preparations for Nixon's visit gave rise to a tidal wave of discourse in the world press on the possible collusion of the leaders of the People's Republic of China and the United States behind the backs of the peoples of Indo-China and in defiance of their interests. It was pointed out, in particular, that the invitation to come to the People's Republic of China, which was extended to Nixon immediately after the publication of the new peace plan set forth by the South Vietnamese patriots, gave rise in US ruling circles to the dangerous illusion that the key to a peace in Indo-China with "honour" for the USA lay in Peking.

The US Government, on January 25, 1972, put forward "new" proposals on the Vietnam issue—the so-called US-Saigon "eight-point peace plan". The United States exerted every effort to present this plan in a good light, but one glance was enough to see that, if the plan were put into effect, the American imperialists would reduce to nil the results of the heroic struggle of the Vietnamese people.

These proposals were flatly rejected by the patriots of Vietnam and condemned by progressive people throughout the world. In its statement of

February 12, 1972, denouncing the US "peace plan", the Soviet Government declared: "In solidarity with the just position, dictated by the ideals of peace, which is maintained by the governments of the Republic of South Vietnam and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, the Soviet Government declares that it is fully convinced that a realistic and constructive basis for a genuine settlement of the Vietnam problem is provided by the seven-point proposals which have been reaffirmed and explained in the statement of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam of February 2, this year."

The internationalist position of the Soviet Union met with the complete approval of the participants in the World Assembly for Peace and Independence for the Peoples of Indo-China, which was held in Versailles on February 11-13, 1972. The Versailles Assembly, which, in the unanimous opinion of the world press, was the most representative to date of all international meetings of the peace-loving forces in support of the struggle of the peoples of Indo-China (it was attended by more than 1,200 representatives of 84 countries), was greatly surprised by the absence there of representatives of the People's Republic of China. Getting ready at that time to welcome Nixon, Peking refused to send its delegates to the Assembly, and did not mention a single word about its work to the Chinese people.

The visit of the President of the United States to the People's Republic of China at the end of February, 1972, was the outcome of lengthy Sino-American contacts. And although Nixon's talks with Chou En-lai and his meeting with the "Great Helmsman" were shrouded in the deepest secre-

cy, certain results were, nevertheless, quite obvious: a drawing together of China and America was taking place on an anti-Soviet basis, and on the basis of disregard for the interests of the national-liberation movement. These results showed up clearly through the mass of propaganda rubbish piled up by the world press, particularly the Chinese and American, at the time of Nixon's stay in the People's Republic of China and shortly after his return home. As an old Chinese saying goes: "Rocks are seen only when the water falls away".

The results of the visit, like the complete about-face in policy of Mao Tse-tung's group in recent years, are plain to see in the joint Sino-US communique. In this document, even where the Chinese side outlines its stand, it is impossible to find any signs that the People's Republic of China is a socialist state which in all circumstances will uphold and defend the interests of the socialist community. When expounding further on this document, Chou Hua-min, Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade of the People's Republic of China, at the third session of the UN Conference on Trade and Development on April 20, 1972, said: "China, like most of the Asian, African and Latin American countries, is a developing country and belongs to the Third World." The Peking leaders did not deem it necessary to comment in the communique on many major international issues—the situation in the Arab East, disarmament, etc.—while on such a vital matter as the struggle of the peoples of Indo-China they took up a stand which caused considerable concern.

Two things put the progressive public on their guard. Firstly, the Chinese agreed to insert in the

text of the joint communique praise for the US Government's "eight-point peace plan", which was called a "basis for reaching an agreement" on the Vietnam issue. And this was done after the "eight points" had been rejected by the Vietnamese people and condemned by the progressive world public. Secondly, the Peking leaders did not mention a single word in their part of the communique about Chinese support for the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, which—and Peking also realises this—is an outpost of socialism in South-East Asia.

It is not accidental either that only later did the communique say that the People's Republic of China backs the seven-point programme of the Republic of South Vietnam.

The Western press, and the American press, in particular, heatedly debated the question that, in the course of the negotiations in Peking and Shanghai, bargaining actually went on behind the backs of the Vietnamese and other peoples of Indo-China. The press referred to the section in the Sino-American communique concerning Taiwan, which said that the United States would continue gradually to reduce its armed forces and military bases on Taiwan as tension lessens in this area. Commenting on this point, the US newspaper, *Christian Science Monitor*, said that Nixon had promised that the United States would pull out of Taiwan if the Chinese would help to persuade Hanoi to accept the American terms for a settlement of the Vietnam issue.

All this could have been treated as the usual conjectures of capitalist press had it not been for Peking's policy, which is becoming increasingly open in its hostility to the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, and is developing and consoli-

dating ties, and even political collaboration, with imperialism.

The Peking leaders, pursuing this line, did not want to take any active steps in mobilising world public opinion against the US aggression in Vietnam. They did not want to do anything that might damage the understanding and friendly relations developing between the two countries.

It is interesting to take a look at how the Peking leadership has reacted in the past 12 months to the escalation by the US military of their aggressive moves in Indo-China.

In July, 1971, the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam advanced a major peace initiative: it set forth at the Paris talks a seven-point programme for a settlement of the South Vietnam issue. This step of the South Vietnamese patriots took the US Government by surprise, and made it very difficult for the Americans to continue their aggression. But salvation came again, from the same direction, from Peking: a sensational announcement was made right at that time about the invitation to the President of the United States to visit China. This enabled Washington to evade giving a reply to the proposals of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam.

The US Air Force bombed the territory of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam heavily for several days in a row in December, 1971, while Peking, pretending that nothing much had happened, cordially welcomed a US government delegation headed by Brigadier-General A. M. Haig.

And lastly, in February, 1972, the Chinese leadership demonstratively ignored the World Assembly for Peace and Independence for the Peoples of Indo-China. Peking in those days was preoccu-

pied with altogether different cares, namely, how to best organise the welcome—so that it would be called later a “week that changed the world”—for the head of the state which the participants in the Versailles Assembly had condemned for its criminal aggression against the peoples of Indo-China.

In an interview given to the magazine, *U.S. News & World Report*, Doak Barnett, a prominent US Sinologist, said (as was made clear by the Shanghai communique) “the Chinese Communist objective... has been to try to create conditions which would lead the United States to withdraw from Asia... The Chinese may feel compelled to re-evaluate this objective, at least, in the short run... The leaders in Peking may be ambivalent... on whether there is some advantage in the US maintaining a position in that area...”

These examples show that the calculations of the American ruling circles on using Peking's services to relieve the position in Indo-China were not without solid foundation. But, as many times before, American imperialism was grossly mistaken. The fate of Indo-China was not being decided either in Washington or Peking, but by the Indo-Chinese peoples themselves, who, relying in their just struggle on the support of the Soviet Union and other fraternal socialist countries and of all progressive and peace-loving forces of the world, were fully resolved to expel the American aggressors.

Nixon's visit to Peking did not help in any way to stabilise the situation in South-East Asia. It was merely the climax of the lengthy Sino-American contacts, and opened a new stage in the drawing together of Peking and Washington. It was not by accident that the newspaper, *La Nation*,

said on April 21, 1972, in connection with the attitude of the People's Republic of China towards the US bombing of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam: "Despite China's protest against the bombing, and despite even the outward 'anti-Americanism' displayed in the press and in official slogans, Peking does not stop showering smiles upon the United States."

These "smiles" continued virtually throughout 1972 despite the fact that the US Air Force rained thousands of bombs and rockets on Vietnam, on a scale hitherto unknown. While flirting with the United States, Peking covertly and sometimes overtly raised all kinds of difficulties to impede the economic and military assistance the Soviet Union and the European socialist countries were rendering to the DRV. The situation further deteriorated after the Americans mined the North-Vietnamese ports and the Vietnamese patriots could be supplied only via Chinese territory.

Thus, even a brief analysis of the Peking leaders' policy in relation to Vietnam demonstrates that, basing themselves since the sixties on hegemonic and anti-Soviet positions, opposing unity of the ranks of the international communist, working-class, and national-liberation movements, and advancing adventurist slogans directed at kindling a new world war, the Peking leaders, in the long run, have found themselves in the same boat with the most reactionary forces of imperialism, in the company of those waging a dirty war against the peoples of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, in the company of those against whom they not so long ago urged all the peoples of the world to launch a "great revolutionary war".

Peking's double-faced policy in world affairs becomes particularly obvious against the background

of the clear and consistent stand of the Soviet Union both in relation to the People's Republic of China and to the struggle of the Vietnamese people. This stand was reaffirmed at the 24th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (which, incidentally, came in for practically no comment at all in the Chinese press—the nasty insinuations made by Chinese propaganda can hardly be called comment on the work of this Congress).

In his report to the Congress, Leonid Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, pointed out: "Our Party has resolutely opposed the attempts to distort the Marxist-Leninist teaching, and split the international communist movement and the ranks of the fighters against imperialism... It is all the more absurd and harmful to sow dissent between China and the USSR considering that this is taking place in a situation in which the imperialists have been stepping up their aggressive actions against the freedom-loving peoples. More than ever before the situation demands cohesion and joint action by all the anti-imperialist, revolutionary forces, instead of fanning hostility between such states as the USSR and China."

The principled line of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union with respect to the Vietnam issue was also reaffirmed at the 24th Congress which spoke out firmly in support of the efforts of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam to bring about a just settlement of the Vietnam problem in conformity with the aspirations of the Vietnamese people. In the report of the Party Central Committee, which he delivered at the 24th Congress, Leonid Brezhnev declared:

"The Democratic Republic of Vietnam may be sure that in its armed struggle and its peaceful endeavour it can continue to rely on the Soviet Union's fraternal support." The Appeal of the 24th Congress "Freedom and Peace to the Peoples of Indo-China!" emphasises: "We declare our unreserved solidarity with the liberation forces of South Vietnam and wish them further success in delivering their country from the interventionists and the mercenary Saigon regime, and in winning the right to decide their future independently."

The delegation of the Vietnam Workers' Party—headed by Le Duan, First Secretary of the Party's Central Committee—which was present at the 24th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, expressed their appreciation of the genuine internationalist position of the Soviet Union on the Vietnam question. In his address of greeting to the Congress, Le Duan said: "As in the case of the previous war of Resistance against the French colonialists, so in the present struggle against the American aggressors for the salvation of the country, and in the building of socialism, the Vietnamese people enjoy the constant support and enormous valuable assistance of the Communist Party and the Government of the Soviet Union and the entire Soviet people. From the very moment the American imperialists unleashed their aggressive war in South Vietnam and their destructive war against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, the Soviet Union has invariably sided with the Vietnamese people."

A significant act of political support for the struggle of the Vietnamese people was the visit paid to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam in October, 1971, by a Soviet party and government delegation, led by Nikolai Podgorny, Member of the

Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and President of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet. As a result of the talks which took place in Hanoi in the course of this visit, new agreements were signed on the granting of free economic aid to Vietnam in 1972 and also of credits for further economic and defence aid for the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.

The joint Soviet-Vietnamese communique, adopted at the end of the Soviet delegation's visit to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, stressed the opinion of the Vietnam Workers' Party and the entire Vietnamese people that the aid and support given by the Communist Party and the Government of the Soviet Union in the past years "most clearly demonstrated the internationalism of the Soviet people and their militant solidarity with the people of Vietnam."

The Soviet Union's principled stand on the Vietnam issue was also clearly outlined by the Soviet side in the course of the talks with US President Nixon in Moscow in May, 1972. In the joint Soviet-American communique, the Soviet side particularly emphasised its full solidarity with the peoples of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia in their just struggle for national independence and social progress. The communique pointed out that, firmly supporting the proposals of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the Republic of South Vietnam, which were a realistic and constructive basis for a settlement of the Vietnamese problem, the Soviet Union favoured the immediate ending of the bombing of North Vietnam, the complete and unconditional withdrawal of the troops of the United States and its allies from South Vietnam, so that the peoples of Indo-China would be able to

decide their own destiny without outside interference.

January 27, 1973 is a historic day in the struggle of the Vietnamese people. On that day the agreement to end the war and restore peace in Vietnam was signed in Paris. The heroic struggle which the courageous Vietnamese people had waged for more than a decade, the struggle carried on by the countries of the socialist community, by the communist and workers' parties, by all progressive forces in the world, was brought to a successful conclusion. It is impossible to overestimate the historical significance of this achievement, for the document stipulates that the USA should discontinue all acts of aggression against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, the first socialist state in South East Asia, and undertake not to interfere in the domestic affairs of South Vietnam and it also clearly defined the fundamental democratic rights of the South-Vietnamese population. The importance of the agreement lies also in the fact that it is an outstanding landmark in the peoples' struggle for freedom and national independence. "The victory of our people", says the Appeal to the nation issued by the Central Committee of the Vietnam Workers' Party and the DRV Government, "is simultaneously an epoch-making victory of the forces of socialism, national independence, democracy and peace, of freedom-loving and peace-loving peoples the world over."

True to its internationalist duty, the Soviet Union has always resolutely supported the political and diplomatic efforts of the governments of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam and their realistic and constructive proposals at the Paris talks. "We have always regarded it

as a cardinal objective of the Soviet Union's foreign policy to seek to eliminate the seat of war in Indo-China." Leonid Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union said in his Report at a joint meeting of the CPSU Central Committee, of the USSR Supreme Soviet and the RSFSR Supreme Soviet in celebration of the 50th Anniversary of the Formation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The signing of the agreement evoked feelings of joy and satisfaction in those who with great sympathy had followed the heroic struggle of the Vietnamese people for many years and rendered them wholehearted support and many-sided assistance. The Chinese press also commented on this outstanding event but the commentaries did not contain an objective assessment of the role of the socialist countries, the world communist and workers' movement, and all progressive forces, as the decisive foreign-policy essential factor in the victory of the Vietnamese people.

All through the years of war Peking was pursuing vis-à-vis the DRV a policy of overt military, economic and political pressure, urging the Vietnamese people to wage a "protracted" war. Apparently, in those years the war in Vietnam suited the interests of the Peking leaders. After the visit of the US President to the PRC the Party leaders' attitude to the war changed for it became an obstacle hampering the development of Sino-American relations. In this connection *Washington Post* said on February 8, 1973, commenting on the forthcoming visit of Kissinger to Peking (which took place between February 15 and 19), that the Presidential advisor would bring China a reward for Peking's assistance in "regulating" the Vietnamese war.

The policy pursued by the PRC leadership demonstrates that both the Leftist and the right-wing opportunists, in the final count, always come to side with reactionary forces. Such is the logic of class struggle. The events of the past few years and even months have shown that the course pursued by the Mao Tse-tung's group with respect to the USSR, most of the socialist countries, and the communist parties has remained essentially the same.

The present revision of Peking's tactics is due above all to the setbacks it has suffered; it is prompted by a desire to attain the same objectives by different, more flexible, means. This revision, however, does not at all mean that Peking's divisive policy with respect to the world revolutionary movement has been scrapped. This policy is dangerous because it objectively facilitates the actions of imperialists on a world scale and at the individual sectors of their struggle against the revolutionary movement. Therefore, no matter how vigorously the Peking leaders would engage in self-advertising, posing as friends of all fighters for national liberation, they remain traitors to the revolutionary and the national-liberation movement.

This is the result of the actions of the Mao Tse-tung's group, which by its divisive activities in the international communist, workers' and national-liberation movements, has done great damage to the struggle of the patriots of Indo-China.

Е. Мархинин
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Age

Sex

You need not give your name and address if you prefer not to.